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Introduction
The global economy has recently experienced the biggest
financial crisis in history, and the United Kingdom, like many
other advanced economies, has experienced its deepest
recession for at least a generation.  The responses from the
monetary, fiscal and regulatory authorities across the world
have been substantial and wide ranging.  In particular, like
central banks in other advanced economies, the Bank of
England’s operations to offer liquidity insurance to the banking
system and to implement monetary policy have evolved
rapidly during this period.  That has resulted in a considerable 
expansion of central banks’ balance sheets:  as a proportion of
GDP, the Bank’s balance sheet is about as large as at any point
in the past two centuries (Chart 1).
The Bank’s balance sheet — its assets and liabilities — enables
the Bank to fulfil its core purposes, which are to ensure
monetary stability and to contribute to financial stability.  To
understand the extraordinary measures the Bank has taken
during the financial crisis, it is important to understand how
the Bank uses its balance sheet to implement monetary policy
and offer liquidity insurance to the banking system.  
The next section describes the Bank’s balance sheet prior to
the crisis after a revised operational framework was introduced
in May 2006.  The article then describes how the Bank’s
balance sheet has evolved in the light of the changes to the
Bank’s operations during the financial crisis and summarises
how the Bank has developed its management of the associated
financial risks.  The article concludes with an outlook on how
the balance sheet is likely to develop when the extraordinary
measures taken are eventually unwound.(2)
The Bank’s balance sheet prior to the crisis
Like any other balance sheet, the Bank’s balance sheet contains
assets and liabilities.  Chart 2 and Chart 3 show the
development of the Bank’s assets and liabilities since the start
of 2006.(3)
The largest assets and liabilities
Chart 2 shows that the two largest items on the liability side
of the Bank’s balance sheet are the two components of central
bank money — banknotes, and central bank reserves held by
commercial banks at the Bank of England.  Prior to the crisis,
This article sets out how monetary policy implementation and liquidity provision during the
financial crisis have affected the size and composition of the Bank of England’s balance sheet.  It
extends and updates a recent speech by Paul Fisher, Executive Director Markets, and describes the
main components of the Bank’s balance sheet prior to and during the crisis.
(1) The authors would like to thank Tarkus Frost and Matt Roberts for their help in
producing this article.  
(2) Fisher (2009) contains a timeline of the Bank’s operations during the financial crisis.
(3) Chart 2 and Chart 3 show data up to 10 February 2010.
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assets acquired in the Bank’s open market repo operations
were the main balancing items to the Bank’s central bank
money liabilities (Chart 3).  These are described further below.
Notes
Among the Bank’s liabilities are the banknotes used in
everyday transactions (shown in blue on Chart 2).  They are
supplied on demand and are bought by commercial banks from
the Bank of England at face value by debiting the purchaser’s
reserves account.  Under legislation dating from 1844,
banknotes and the assets backing them are held on a separate
balance sheet — called Issue Department — while the Bank’s
other assets and liabilities, and capital held against them, are
held on Banking Department.  Because the existence of these
two departments does not affect the impact of the Bank’s
operations on financial markets or the wider economy, this
article focuses on the consolidated balance sheet of the two
departments.
Central bank reserves
The other large liability on the Bank’s balance sheet is central
bank reserves balances, shown in green in Chart 2.  Reserves
balances are current account balances held by commercial
banks at the Bank of England.  Together with banknotes, these
balances constitute central bank money.  Reserves are a 
high-quality liquid asset for commercial banks to hold.  In
addition to purchasing banknotes from the Bank, commercial
banks use reserves to make payments between each other.  
Reserves balances are intrinsic to the Bank’s implementation of
monetary policy.  So to understand how the Bank’s balance
sheet has changed during the crisis, it is important to
understand the Bank’s operational framework to implement
monetary policy in normal circumstances.  Before describing
this operational framework, the next subsection describes
some of the other items on the Bank’s balance sheet.  
Other assets and liabilities
Foreign exchange reserves
The institutional arrangements for exchange rate policy and
foreign exchange reserves were set out as part of the new
monetary policy framework introduced by the Government in
1997.(1) Under this framework, the government is responsible
for determining the United Kingdom’s foreign exchange rate
regime.  The government’s official foreign exchange reserves
are managed by the Bank as the government’s agent.  They are
held in the Exchange Equalisation Account — an account of the
government — and do not appear on the Bank’s balance sheet.
But the framework also provides for the Bank of England to
have its own separate pool of foreign exchange reserves.  The
Bank may use these foreign exchange reserves at its discretion
to intervene in foreign exchange markets as part of its
operating framework for meeting the inflation target which
the Government sets for the Monetary Policy Committee
(MPC).  The MPC has not chosen to intervene in foreign
exchange markets since the inception of the 1997 monetary
policy framework.(2)
At approximately $6 billion, the size of the Bank’s foreign
exchange reserves is modest — around one tenth the size of
the government’s gross reserves.  The Bank finances the
acquisition of its foreign exchange reserves by issuing foreign
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(1) www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/press_40_97letter.htm.
(2) Intervention has been discussed on several occasions and those discussions were
reported in the relevant minutes of the MPC meeting.  See, for example, 
paragraph 41 in the minutes of the meeting held on 3–4 May 2000, available at
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markets (these liabilities are shown in yellow in Chart 2).  The
proceeds of this issuance are reinvested in high-quality, liquid
securities that could be quickly realised should the MPC decide
to intervene.  These assets are shown as part of the dark blue
section in Chart 3.
Ways and Means
‘Ways and Means’ is the name given to the government’s
overdraft facility at the Bank (shown in brown in Chart 3).
Prior to the transfer of the government’s day-to-day sterling
cash management from the Bank of England to the Debt
Management Office (DMO) in 2000, the outstanding daily
balance varied significantly, reflecting net cash flows into and
out of government accounts that were not offset by
government cash management operations.  After the transfer
of cash management from the Bank to the DMO, borrowing
from the Bank was not used to facilitate day-to-day cash
management and the balance was stable at around 
£13.4 billion until the facility was repaid during 2008.  The
Bank and the Treasury agreed to this repayment in order 
to improve the Bank’s ability to manage its balance sheet.  
The facility remains available for use and at the end of 
December 2008 HM Treasury borrowed temporarily from the
Bank using the facility to fund the refinancing of loans that the
Bank had earlier made to the Financial Services Compensation
Scheme and to Bradford & Bingley. 
Other items
Some of the Bank’s capital and reserves are held in equity
holdings, eg in the Bank for International Settlements and the
European Central Bank and, of course, the Bank’s physical
assets.  The remainder (the Bank’s ‘free’ capital), together with
non interest bearing cash ratio deposits placed with the Bank
by UK-resident commercial banks, is predominantly invested in
a portfolio of sterling-denominated securities.  These assets
are shown as part of the dark blue section in Chart 3. 
The Bank also provides banking services for a small number of
customers, mainly the UK Government and other central
banks.  These accounts appear as liabilities of the Bank and are
backed by assets acquired in open market operations or by
matching (secured) deposits in the market.  They are part of
the other liabilities and other assets shown in Chart 2 and
Chart 3 respectively.
The Bank’s sterling monetary framework from 
May 2006 
A central bank’s power to influence market interest rates
derives from the banking system’s demand for central bank
money — notes and reserves — and the liquidity services it
provides by being the ultimate means of settling payments.  In
normal circumstances, central banks tend to implement the
desired monetary policy stance by changing interest rates (the
price of central bank money) and supplying the quantity of
reserves consistent with achieving this price.  In such normal
circumstances, the size and/or composition of the central bank
balance sheet plays no independent role.  As a result, balance
sheet management mainly involves optimising the maturity
match between assets and liabilities.  The remainder of this
section describes how the Bank managed its balance sheet
prior to the onset of the crisis following the introduction of a
revised operational framework — the sterling monetary
framework (SMF) — in May 2006.  
The SMF has been described in detail in previous speeches and
Bank publications.(1) This article focuses on the main elements
of the framework.  The three main elements are:  reserves,
operational standing facilities and open market operations.  In
normal times, over a month as a whole, a commercial bank’s
reserves holdings are remunerated at Bank Rate so long as, on
average, they fall within a range around the reserves target it
has chosen.  Individually, on any given day, banks have a choice
between varying their reserves holdings at the Bank and
transacting in the market.  Commercial banks may also
transact with the Bank of England, in unlimited amounts, in
the Bank’s operational standing facilities (for both lending and
deposits), but they do so at a less favourable interest rate.
Provided banks are able to transact in the market to meet their
individual reserves targets, reserves averaging and operational
standing facilities should keep overnight and other very 
short-term interest rates broadly in line with Bank Rate.  But
for the rate-setting objective to be met, the Bank needs to
ensure that its (net) supply of reserves is in line with demand.
That entails ensuring that sufficient reserves are provided
through open market operations to allow banks to meet their
collective target.  
The introduction of a system of voluntary reserves, with
reserves averaged over a maintenance period during which
they are remunerated at Bank Rate, resulted in reserves
balances of around £24 billion in May 2006.  Subsequently,
over each monthly maintenance period, aggregate reserves
reflected the collective choices of banks and this component
of the Bank’s balance sheet expanded and contracted
accordingly.  
The approach by which commercial banks themselves decided
how many reserves to hold, rather than having targets set for
them by the central bank, was a uniquely distinctive feature of
the SMF.  The next section shows that the flexibility it provided
was helpful to banks in managing their liquidity needs during
the early part of the crisis.
Open market operations
The Bank uses open market operations (OMOs) to provide the
reserves which banks need to meet their collective target.
Together, they are ordinarily the balancing asset to match the
(1) See for example Bank of England (2008a,b), Clews (2005), Mac Gorain (2005) and
Tucker (2004).Research and analysis The Bank’s balance sheet during the crisis 37
Bank’s reserves account liabilities.  Day-to-day flows across the
Bank’s balance sheet, including purchases and returns of
banknotes, are reflected in so-called ‘autonomous factors’.
These autonomous factors affect reserves and therefore
determine the size of required reserve injections.  
Acquiring the assets backing the note issue and reserves could
in principle exclusively be done via the Bank’s short-term
operations — lending central bank money against high-quality
sovereign collateral securities in ‘repo’ transactions for a fixed
term (typically one week).  These operations are shown in
yellow in Chart 3.  
Effective and efficient implementation of monetary policy
does not require the Bank to roll over its entire stock of
financing every week in a repo of one-week maturity.  While
reserves have a relatively short maturity (since banks set their
reserves targets each month), much of the banknote issue is
expected to be long-lasting.  In order to avoid an inefficient
churn in its assets, the Bank started from January 2006 to
invest part of the notes issue in assets with a longer maturity
and offered long-term repo operations at three, six, nine and
twelve-month maturities.  These operations in which central
bank money is lent against the same high-quality sovereign
securities as in the Bank’s short-term operations are included
in the light blue area in Chart 3.(1) And, in January 2008, the
Bank began to conduct purchases of UK government bonds,
included in the dark blue area in Chart 3, as a device to match
the maturity of the note issue with longer maturing assets.(2)
These purchases were suspended following the MPC decision
in March 2009 to purchase assets — including gilts — as part
of the implementation of monetary policy.
The Bank’s balance sheet since the start of the
current crisis
The objectives of the Bank’s operating framework are twofold.
The first is to implement monetary policy by maintaining
market interest rates in line with Bank Rate at maturities to
the next MPC decision date.  The second is to reduce the cost
of disruptions to the liquidity and payments services supplied
by commercial banks, via the provision of liquidity insurance
balanced against the costs of creating incentives for banks to
take greater risks. 
The distinction between the two objectives is important in
order to understand the Bank’s response to the crisis.  For
monetary policy implementation, the main distinction to make
is the period to March 2009 and the period since then, when
policy has taken the form both of setting the MPC’s interest
rate and achieving its objective for asset purchases.  For the
Bank’s liquidity insurance operations, the evolution was more
continuous, although the pace of change accelerated in the
period immediately after the intensification of the financial
crisis in September 2008.  The final changes are in the process
of being implemented as a permanent feature of the Bank’s
operational framework. 
On balance sheet liquidity insurance operations
The Bank’s liquidity insurance operations and facilities have
been at the heart of the Bank’s response to the financial crisis.
In common with other central banks, and sometimes in
conjunction with them, the Bank has deployed a number of
measures to provide liquidity insurance to, and so contribute
to underpin confidence in, the banking system.  At the height
of the crisis, these resulted in a substantial increase in the size
of the Bank’s balance sheet.(3)
Extended collateral three-month repo OMOs
In response to the re-emergence of strains in term money
markets towards the end of 2007, the Bank of England — along
with other central banks — announced, on 12 December 2007,
measures designed to address these pressures.  Specifically the
Bank announced changes to its long-term repo operations.
The amount offered at three-month maturity was expanded
and the range of high-quality collateral accepted at this
maturity was widened from high-quality sovereign securities
to include AAA-rated residential mortgage-backed securities
(RMBS) and covered bonds.
Initially, these extended-collateral long-term repos (ELTRs)
were offered in monthly auctions of £10 billion, with the sizes
of subsequent auctions reflecting financial market conditions
at the time.  In particular, in the wake of the disruption to the
global financial system in the autumn of 2008, these
operations were offered in greater size and at greater
frequency, and the range of eligible collateral was further
expanded to include securities backed by commercial
mortgage assets and corporate debt.  At their peak during
January 2009, the stock of outstanding ELTRs reached 
£180 billion (included in the light blue area in Chart 3).
US dollar repo operations 
In response to liquidity pressures in dollar markets the 
Bank of England joined other central banks in offering to lend
US dollars overnight, beginning on 18 September 2008.  The
Bank established a swap facility with the Federal Reserve to
provide the funding for these operations (borrowing US dollars
from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and lending
sterling in return), offering $40 billion initially.  By late
September, the immediate pressure had eased somewhat, but
concerns remained about access to US dollar funding,
especially over the quarter/year end.  The Bank introduced a
(1) For more details about the injection of reserves via long-term repo OMOs see the box
on page 22 of the ‘Markets and operations’ article in the Spring 2006 Quarterly
Bulletin.
(2) For more details about the injection of reserves via bond-purchase OMOs see the box
on pages 22–23 of the ‘Markets and operations’ article in the 2008 Q1 Quarterly
Bulletin.
(3) The Bank can also provide emergency liquidity assistance (ELA).  The impact on the
Bank’s balance sheet would depend on the form in which ELA is undertaken.38 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q1
one-week operation to lend US dollars alongside its overnight
operations.  In mid-October, the central banks involved in 
US dollar operations announced that in order to provide broad
access to liquidity, the existing variable-rate auctions of a fixed
size would be replaced with fixed-rate operations of unlimited
size.(1) The Bank began conducting additional operations at
one-month and three-month maturities, with counterparties
able to borrow any amount against the Bank’s wider pool of
eligible collateral.  At its peak, the stock of US dollars provided
through the Bank’s operations reached about $86 billion.
These assets are shown in pink in Chart 3 and the proceeds of
the swap with the Fed as a liability, in pink in Chart 2.
Pressures in US dollar markets receded by the middle of 2009,
and so the Bank and other central banks announced the
withdrawal of, first the overnight and then the one-month
dollar operation and, in September 2009, of the three-month
operation.  Given the continued improvement in financial
market functioning, the Bank, in co-ordination with other
central banks, confirmed at the end of January 2010 the
expiration of its temporary liquidity swap lines with the
Federal Reserve on 1 February 2010. 
Off balance sheet liquidity insurance facilities
The Bank launched two facilities to provide liquidity insurance
to the banking system — the Special Liquidity Scheme (SLS)
and the Discount Window Facility (DWF).  As collateral swaps,
the SLS and the DWF do not appear on the Bank’s balance
sheet and have no impact on reserves provisioning under the
SMF.  Nonetheless, these facilities were important elements of
the Bank’s response to the crisis, and so the next subsection
discusses the key features of these facilities.
Special Liquidity Scheme
The Bank introduced the SLS in April 2008 to improve the
liquidity position of the banking system by allowing banks to
swap high-quality, but temporarily illiquid, mortgage-backed
and other securities for UK Treasury bills.  As the SLS was
designed to deal with existing assets on banks’ balance sheets
following the unexpected closure of some asset-backed
securities markets in 2007, only assets already on commercial
banks’ balance sheets at the end of 2007 were eligible
collateral.  Banks are required to pay a fee for the bills they
borrow against this collateral.  
SLS swaps may be renewed for a period of up to three years
and are thus for longer terms than other central bank liquidity
insurance operations.  When the SLS was launched, the
drawdown period was six months and so was due to close in
October.  In mid-September 2008, however, in view of the
intensification of the financial system stress, the Bank
announced an extension to the drawdown period for the SLS,
to provide banks with additional time to plan their access to
the Scheme in an orderly fashion.  The drawdown window was
extended to 30 January 2009.  The last swaps under the SLS
will therefore expire at the latest in January 2012, at which
point the SLS will terminate.
After the closure of the drawdown period, the Bank announced
in February 2009 that Treasury bills with a face value of
approximately £185 billion had been lent under the Scheme.
Given its scale, the Bank’s operations in the SLS are
indemnified by the Government.
Discount Window Facility
The Bank drew on a number of the features of the SLS in
designing a new, permanent bilateral liquidity insurance
facility, the DWF, which was launched in October 2008.  Under
the DWF, banks may borrow gilts against a wide range of
collateral, at fees reflecting the type of collateral and the size
of drawing.  The terms were designed to be consistent with
avoiding creating incentives for commercial banks to take
greater liquidity risk in future.  And they were also designed to
protect the Bank itself against risk to its balance sheet.
Transactions under the DWF will normally be for 30 days.
However, in recognition of continuing stresses in financial
markets, the Bank announced in January 2009 that, for an
additional fee of 25 basis points, it would temporarily permit
drawing from the DWF with a maximum term of 364 days.
The Bank is considering further widening the collateral eligible
for use in the DWF, subject to the basic principle that the Bank
must be able to value the underlying assets, and manage the
associated risks.  
The implementation of monetary policy
Developments between Summer 2007 and March 2009
In the stressed market conditions that prevailed from 
Summer 2007, and until the MPC introduced asset purchases
in March 2009, the flexibility inherent in the SMF, and use by
the Bank of the contingency measures built into the
framework, were the means of meeting the objective of
implementing monetary policy.  Commercial banks that were
members of the reserves scheme continued to set their
reserves targets at the beginning of each monthly
maintenance period, and the Bank continued to ensure that
the net supply of reserves through its operations matched
banks’ demand.
The Bank’s balance sheet, however, expanded over this period.
Initially, this principally reflected increased commercial bank
demand for reserves given stresses in bank funding markets.
Banks increased their aggregate reserves targets from 
£16 billion in July 2007 to a peak of £45 billion in 
December 2008.  At times during this period, there appeared
to be sudden changes in banks’ demand for reserves within a
(1) This was facilitated by a change to US law permitting the US Federal Reserve to pay
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maintenance period — that is between their monthly
opportunity to reset their targets.  The Bank responded by
injecting additional reserves beyond those needed for banks to
meet their existing targets, via exceptional fine-tuning
operations.  To ensure that the banking system as a whole
could hold the additional reserves without financial penalty
the Bank adjusted the range within which reserves were
remunerated. 
As described above, some of the Bank’s operations also
injected reserves into the banking system.  The approach of
setting the net supply of reserves equal to banks’ aggregate
voluntary targets therefore required the Bank to drain any
excess reserves injected in this way.  In the autumn of 2008
the provision of reserves via the Bank’s ELTRs exceeded the
capacity of the Bank’s existing tools to drain these reserves at
shorter maturities and so bring the net supply of reserves into
line with the aggregate target banks had set.  As a result, the
Bank created a new instrument — the Bank of England bill 
(a non-monetary liability offered generally weekly and with a
maturity of one week) — to drain the additional long-term
reserves provided.  At their peak, over £100 billion of bills were
issued on 8 January 2009.
Overall, for the period until the March 2009 MPC meeting, the
Bank’s operational framework for implementing monetary
policy remained unchanged. 
Developments since March 2009
At its meeting on 5 March 2009, the MPC reduced Bank Rate
by 0.5 percentage points to 0.5%.  At that level, the MPC
judged that Bank Rate was effectively at (or very close to) its
lower bound.  To provide further monetary easing, the MPC
announced that the Bank would undertake a programme of
asset purchases financed by the issuance of central bank
reserves.  The aim of these asset purchases was to boost the
rate of growth of nominal demand to ensure inflation meets
the 2% inflation target in the medium term.
By the start of February 2010, purchases of £200 billion had
been made under the programme.  The vast majority of the
assets purchased have been gilts.  On 4 February 2010 the
MPC voted to maintain asset purchases financed by the
issuance of central bank reserves at £200 billion. 
The working of the Asset Purchase Facility (APF) has been
described elsewhere.(1) But to understand how the APF
impacts the Bank’s balance sheet the role of the Bank of
England Asset Purchase Facility Fund is important.  
The Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund
In January 2009, under a remit from the Chancellor of the
Exchequer, the Bank established a subsidiary company, the
Bank of England Asset Purchase Facility Fund, with the initial
objective of improving the liquidity of the corporate credit
market by making purchases of high-quality private sector
assets.  The accounts of the Fund — which is indemnified for
losses by the Government — are not consolidated with those
of the Bank.  But the Fund is financed by loans from the Bank
shown in green in Chart 3. 
In the initial phase, the Bank’s loans to the Fund were financed
by the issuance of Treasury bills by the DMO.  In March 2009
the remit was extended to allow the MPC to use the APF to
make purchases of assets — including gilts — for monetary
policy purposes.  During this period and until the February
2010 MPC meeting, the Bank’s loans were financed by the
issuance of central bank reserves.  That increase in reserves is
shown in green to the right of the line labelled APF Phase II in
Chart 2. 
The additional reserves created to finance the asset purchases
were considerably in excess of those required to meet the
voluntary targets banks set each month.  Hence significant
elements of the SMF were suspended:  commercial banks
ceased to set reserves targets and the Bank has, since 
March 2009, remunerated all reserves balances at Bank Rate.  
Collateral management
The expansion and change in the composition of the Bank’s
balance sheet shown in Chart 2 and Chart 3 went hand in
hand with a significant change in the risk characteristics of the
balance sheet.  
The widening of collateral accepted in long-term repo
operations, and the introduction of the SLS and DWF, meant
that the collateral associated with the Bank’s balance sheet
and off balance sheet items moved towards higher-risk assets,
notably structured products such as asset-backed securities
(ABS) and covered bonds. 
As a result, the Bank had to build up its capacity to manage
new types of risk.  In particular, the Bank has undertaken
extensive work to establish risk management processes around
the securities accepted as collateral in its operations and
facilities.  This has included the establishment of a dedicated
collateral management team.  The team includes staff hired
from the private sector with relevant expertise, and the Bank
has drawn on external advice when necessary.  
Credit ratings from the rating agencies generally form part of
the published high-level eligibility criteria for collateral that
the Bank accepts in principle in its operations and facilities.
But when assessing the eligibility of collateral for its operations
and facilities, the Bank also undertakes its own independent
analysis.  Based on that assessment, the Bank may reject
(1) For more information, see Benford et al (2009).  40 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q1
securities offered as collateral even if they have ratings that
would otherwise make them eligible for the Bank’s operations
and facilities.  Conversely, in the event of a downgrade below a
minimum credit ratings criterion, the Bank may allow
collateral to remain eligible, having considered the
circumstances behind the rating action and the quality of the
collateral.
An important tool that the Bank uses to mitigate the risk
associated with the collateral it has accepted in its operations
and facilities is the application of collateral ‘haircuts’.  That is,
the Bank takes collateral with a market value in excess of the
amount that the Bank will lend in return.  These haircuts vary
according to the attributes of the assets.  The Bank’s haircuts
are designed to protect against loss in the event that a
counterparty that has pledged the collateral to the Bank were
to default.  The Bank considers in particular the impact of
scenarios on structured products that other stress tests may
not cover, including so-called ‘jump-to-default’ scenarios in
which a counterparty that has pledged collateral defaults with
little prior warning.  Collateral haircuts are reviewed on a
regular basis, for example, the Bank recently changed the
haircuts applied to its sovereign collateral having taken
account of changes in market volatility over time.(1)
Given the potential for market prices to move each day and
the large swings experienced in the past (Chart 4), the Bank
revalues collateral on a daily basis and will call for more
collateral if the market value of the collateral is no longer
sufficient to cover the exposure as adjusted by the haircut.  To
deal with illiquidity in ABS markets the Bank has developed its
own methodology for the valuation of securities where no
market price is available. 
In terms of its on balance sheet assets, as a result of the APF,
the Bank now has outright exposure to a range of high-quality
corporate issuers.  While issuers must meet minimum ratings
requirements the Bank also undertakes its own independent
credit risk analysis. 
The transition of the balance sheet to a 
post-crisis world 
Eventually, as the extraordinary liquidity insurance operations
and the monetary policy operations are unwound, the size of
the Bank’s balance sheet will shrink and its composition
change.
Liquidity insurance operations
Of the liquidity insurance operations described above, some
will be temporary, while others will be permanent.  
For example, the Bank’s US dollar operations were intended to
be a temporary measure in the context of exceptionally
stressed market conditions and have now ended as these
stresses have abated.  The SLS — which will terminate at the
end of January 2012 — is also a temporary measure to enable
banks to swap high-quality assets that became illiquid in the
period of greatest market stress for UK Treasury bills.  
On the other hand, ELTRs and the DWF are intended to be
permanent features of the SMF.  Indeed, the DWF was perhaps
the most significant development in the Bank’s operational
framework during the crisis.  When acting to alleviate financial
system stress, central banks have traditionally been prepared
to lend to commercial banks against a wider population of
good-quality collateral.  In launching the DWF, the Bank took
the decision that it could be more transparent about the
collateral it is prepared to take in this new, permanent public
facility.  
The use market participants make of ELTRs and the DWF will
reflect two factors:  the prices the Bank sets and — in the case
of the ELTRs — the amount the Bank decides to offer the
market.  
In the ELTRs the Bank sets a minimum spread for bids against
the extended collateral set.  This is set at a level such that it 
is less attractive to participate in the Bank’s operations than 
to finance the collateral in the private repo markets in 
non-stressed conditions.  In the autumn of 2008, the Bank
consulted on further changes to the ELTR framework, which
would provide better incentives for commercial banks to
manage liquidity risk prudently, while providing greater
liquidity insurance in periods of financial stress.  These are
planned to be introduced in 2010.
Similar principles apply to the DWF.  Unlike the extended
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borrowed is determined by the counterparty, but at prices and
on conditions determined in advance by the Bank.  The prices
are a function of the collateral type offered by the
counterparty, and the amount of the counterparty’s
borrowing;  and they increase as banks’ borrowing increases,
and/or is made against less liquid collateral.  Even at low levels
of borrowing, however, the pricing structure is designed to be
more expensive than is available in private markets in 
non-stressed circumstances.  In this way, the pricing schedule
for the Bank’s provision of liquidity insurance is carefully
balanced against the cost of the existence of insurance
creating incentives for banks to take excessive liquidity risk.
Monetary policy operations
When the time comes for the MPC to tighten monetary policy,
it will be able to do so either by raising Bank Rate, selling
assets back to the market, or by some combination of the 
two.  If assets are sold, reserves balances will fall accordingly
and that will tend to cause the overall size of the balance 
sheet to contract.  The Bank can also drain excess reserves
independently (eg by issuing Bank bills).
However, the overall size of the balance sheet may not return
to pre-crisis levels.  For example, commercial banks may
choose to hold persistently higher reserves balances than
before the crisis.  One motivation for this might be to help
meet the more demanding liquidity requirements recently
proposed by the Financial Services Authority.  
The Bank has also recently expanded the range of banks that
are eligible to hold reserves accounts, to include smaller banks
in order to help them to manage their liquidity.  This
potentially adds around 200 commercial banks as Bank
counterparties.  Although the combined reserves balances of
these banks will be small relative to the reserves balances of
the Bank’s existing counterparties prior to the crisis, this is an
important extension to the range of banks that is able to
access the Bank’s market-wide facilities.
Independent of the operation of monetary policy, the Bank will
continue its schemes to support the operation of the financing
markets for corporate debt for as long as they are judged to be
necessary.  Since the MPC’s decision on 4 February 2010 to
maintain the stock of asset purchases financed by the issuance
of central bank reserves at £200 billion, purchases of corporate
debt have once again been financed by the issue of Treasury
bills and the DMO’s cash management operations.
Conclusion
The significant recent expansion of the Bank’s balance sheet
has been a necessary response to the extraordinary
circumstances in global financial markets and the global
economy.  It reflects an expansion of both the Bank’s liquidity
insurance operations, and more recently the addition of asset
purchases as an operating objective of the Monetary Policy
Committee. 
By their nature, the size of the liquidity insurance operations,
which have already diminished, will continue to shrink as
economic and financial conditions return to more normal
times.  The Bank has, in its permanent facilities, set pricing
schedules that will be unattractive to banks in unstressed
market conditions, because banks are expected to fund
themselves in private markets, not via the central bank’s
balance sheet.  So banks have a clear incentive not to use the
Bank’s liquidity insurance operations as conditions normalise.  
Similarly, the expansion of the Bank’s balance sheet as a
consequence of the MPC’s asset purchases will in time be
reversed as monetary policy is tightened.  Over time, the size
of that part of the Bank’s balance sheet attributable to the
SMF will revert to being a function of the size of the banknote
issue and commercial banks’ demand to hold reserves at the
central bank.  42 Quarterly Bulletin  2010 Q1
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